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Former Virginia governor Robert McDonnell (R) returns to court to ltear the jury's verdict Thursday. 
BY JEFFREY BELLIN 
The guilty verdicts in the trial of former Virginia governor - and Republican sinking star - Robett McDonnell highlight an ugly tension between Ameri-
ca's politics and its public cormption laws. Beyond the pricey 
gifts, unraveling marriage and throw-your-wife-under-the-
bus defense that dominated the media coverage lies a more 
important story. The real stars of this drama were the vague 
public corruption statutes that took down the former 
governor and the elusive distinction they draw between 
"politics as usual" and criminality. 
McDonnell was not charged with bribery. As is common 
in this context, federal prosecutors charged him with the 
easier-to-prove crimes of fraud and e>.t01tion. The fraud 
counts were based on a statute that prohibits devising a 
"scheme or artifice to defraud" through the "wire[s]." The 
extortion counts were based on a statute that prohibits 
obtaining property "under color of official right." Both 
offenses are punishable by up to 20 years in prison. 
The fraud theory works like this: As governor; McDonnell 
was supposed to act on behalf of the people of Virginia. 
Instead, he solicited money from a private company to act as 
needed on its behalf, thus defrauding Virginians of a (small) 
portion of McDonnell's "honest services!' The e>.tortion 
theory is similar. McDonnell obtained private property that 
he was not entitled to in return for a promise to perform 
official acts 01; in the language of the statute, obtained 
money under "color of official right!' 
These commonly invoked charges are powerful 
anti-corruption tools: so powerful, in fact, that they appear 
to criminalize 111de swaths of U.S. politics. Companies, 
unions and individuals give generously to politicians and 
their surrogates every year. An industrious prosecutor could 
find boatloads of officials who benefited from these gifts and 
then took action on behalf of those entities. Is this also 
"honest services" fraud and extortion? Legally speaking, the 
answer is: "Who knows?" The distinction between a 
successful fund raiser and a diabolical crook is frighteningly 
subtle. 
The Snpreme Comt insists that there is a clear distinction 
between the felony offenses that upended McDonnell and 
our tried-and-tme system of allowing private entities and 
individuals to shower government officials with campaign 
contributions and other gifts. That distinction comes down 
to the contents of the official's mind. To prove "honest 
services" fraud or political e>.tortion, a prosecutor must 
show that someone like McDonnell accepted a particular 
donation with the understanding that he would perform 
official acts in return. This agreement to trade gifts for acts is 
all that separates "politics as usual" from felony corruption. 
Critically, the corrupt agreement need not be document-
ed, or even articulated. The prosecution's proof, as in the 
McDonnell case, normally takes the form of evidence that 
money went to a public servant and official acts followed. 
The jury can infer the requisite agreement from the 
circumstantial evidence. If a jury sees "knowing winks and 
nods" (tile actual jury instruction) in the flow of money from 
donor to candidate, federal prison awaits. 
Consistent with these principles, the McDonnell jury's 
90-page instructions informed it that it could not convict the 
ex-governor for the things it likely found most distasteful: 
his soliciting personal gifts, exercising terrible judgment or 
prompting underlings to help a guy who paid for a family 
wedding. Rather, the verdict rested on whether, in all these 
perfectly legal actions, thejmyperceived the kno1vingwinks 
and nods that are all the law requires to turn donations into 
federal felonies. That should send chills down the spines of 
public officials across the country. Which, admittedly, might 
not be so bad. 
It would be both \vise (to avoid prison) and good policy for 
officials to discourage large donations, avoid decisions that 
benefit big donors and generally disengage from contribu-
tors. But until that happens, we are stuck with a system in 
which lots of public officials could be convicted of a felony 
but few are prosecuted. 
That's not healthy for a democracy. It gives prosecutors 
vast discretion to choose targets, undermines the credibility 
of prosecutions that do occur and, ultimately, says some-
thing very unsettling about our government. Something has 
to give. We either need to strengthen our campaign finance 
laws or, if that's impossible, acknowledge that our public 
corruption laws are merely aspirational. A political system 
where any given federal, state or local official is just a wink, 
nod and a motivated prosecutor away from federal prosecu-
tion is untenable. 
The writer is an associate professor at William & Mary Law School. 
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